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We Need to  
Think About Values
Introduction
We do a lot of talking about values. In our vision or mission 
statements we formulate the priorities by which we will act and 
decide for the future. We talk about gospel values, Spiritan values, 
democratic values, economic values, American values, family 
values, personal values, and the like. Talking of values is part of 
our political discourse, our moral discourse and our theological 
and congregational discussions. We use the word every day. We 
consider our values a central aspect of who we are and what 
we stand for. Values are the foundation for our priorities, our 
mission and our actions.
Yet in contrast to all the talk about values, we have almost 
complete silence in terms of a discussion on what are values, where 
do they come from, how do you distinguish between true and 
false values, what is the difference between values and feelings, 
how do you teach values. Why do we talk about moral values 
rather than moral laws or virtues and vices? The philosophical 
and theological tradition has discussed at length the morality of 
right and wrong based on the natural law tradition or based on 
the virtue ethics tradition. However, the language of values has 
now crept into our discourse. Marx started talking about values 
in economic terms. Nietzsche undermined traditional moral 
values but also wrote about transvaluation of values in a rather 
unorthodox sense. In the first half of the twentieth century the 
phenomenologists, Max Scheler, Nicholai Hartmann, Dietrich 
von Hildebrand, and others devoted some efforts to defining 
values but the tradition has not been continued. For the last 
sixty years, Lonergan is the only philosopher or theologian that I 
know of who has given some theoretical account of what values 
are and where they come from.1
It is not surprising then that there is considerable confusion 
as to what a value is and whether we can know the difference 
between true and false values. Alasdair MacIntyre asserts that the 
most prevalent view of values in our present culture is emotivism, 
namely, “that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all 
moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, 
expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or 
evaluative in character.”2 He goes on to say that such expressions 
of feeling are neither true nor false as the category of true or false 
does not apply to feelings. This attitude is indeed very common. 
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It is common to think of values as personal preferences, as 
arbitrary, as irrational, as relativistic, as incommensurable, as 
beyond the scope of rational argument. If this were really so it 
would lead to chaos. But this would seem to fly in the face of the 
fact that we are evaluating, thinking and arguing about values all 
the time and do strongly hold some values to be good and the 
contrary to be evil. I think we can and must make some attempt 
to defend the soundness of value judgments that underpin our 
priorities and our actions. 
What is the best way to do that? Lonergan’s innovation in 
Insight was simply to attend to the activities of understanding 
as they occur in fact in consciousness. From this method 
follows everything else. Cognitional theory, epistemology and 
metaphysics are based on the facts of how we come to know. 
Can we do the same in ethics? Why not! Attend to the process 
of evaluation, describe its emergence, components and causes, 
distinguish evaluating in various spheres, and note how we 
discriminate between good evaluating and bad evaluating. This is 
what we plan to do in this short paper. We will carefully attend to 
the process of evaluating. We will identify the three components 
of cognitive, affective and volitional as they unite in a value 
judgment. We will discover that the process is legitimate and 
justifies our dealing with policies and morals in terms of values.
The Process of Evaluating
Whenever we use expressions such as good, better, best, or 
bad, worse, worst, we are engaged in the process of evaluating. 
We evaluate things, we evaluate people, we evaluate policies, 
actions, food, climate, books: we are evaluating all the time. We 
can do it well or badly, carefully or rashly, explicitly or implicitly. 
We seem to have an innate ability to evaluate and deliberate. 
The process seems to start with a question, is it worthwhile? Is 
this good or bad? We consider the alternatives, the arguments, 
the pros and cons, the consequences, the feelings involved, the 
dangers, the fears, the demands. The process seems to come to 
a conclusion in a judgment of value:  this is the best thing to do 
and there follows the implementation in a course of action. 
  
Lonergan’s treatment of values builds on his earlier work on 
judgments of truth. In Insight he elaborated a cognitional structure 
of three levels of activities: of experiencing, understanding and 
judging. It is a brilliant, detailed description of how we actually 
come to know. It sums up in a neat formula the investigations 
of epistemology since the time of Aristotle. Finally, we have 
an answer to the question of what is truth in terms of how we 
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actually make a correct judgment of truth. Truth is what you find 
when you have examined all the evidence, grasped the connection 
between the evidence and the conclusion, no further relevant 
questions arise, and you posit a judgment.  Lonergan later came to 
realize that there is a fourth level of activities involved in knowing 
good and evil. We usually do not stop when we have discovered 
a truth, a scientific breakthrough, a pure theory. A new discovery 
or insight almost inevitably leads to the question of what are 
you going to do about it, what are its implications, what is its 
worth,  how can it be applied, how can science be implemented 
in technology. If climate science is correct in diagnosing and 
predicting climate catastrophe, then certain courses of action are 
called for. They are good if they alleviate the situation, bad if 
they make it worse. Science does not end in pure truth but in the 
implications, the applications, the changes in human behavior 
that are called for.  Questions for truth are followed by questions 
of value. There are practical implications from most discoveries 
in science and philosophy and so cognitional structure needs to 
be completed with an elaboration of the question of value, the 
deliberative insight and the judgment of value.
What is this process of evaluating? Perhaps a simple, 
concrete example of this process might help. Note the activities 
of questioning, deliberating and concluding which are always 
present. Consider the mental activities we engage in when we set 
out to buy a new mobile phone. Intelligence is obviously involved: 
we ask, where can I buy one, why do I need one, what functions 
does it perform, how much does it cost, where can I get the best 
bargain? These are questions of information, understanding and 
judgments of truth and value. Are feelings involved? We see 
our friends using mobile phones and we want one. We desire, 
we want, we need, we aspire to be connected at all times. We 
like one color and not another, we admire some functions and 
detest some annoyances. We are comfortable with our choice or 
uneasy. We can perform these activities well and get a good phone 
that satisfies our needs at a good price and we are happy ever 
after. Or we perform the activities badly, do not match needs 
to functions, and end up returning the phone within a week. 
Identifying the activities in the process of buying a mobile phone 
is helpful because the same process and activities are involved 
in the more difficult judgments of moral value. Already we can 
see that knowing and feeling are involved. Already we can see 
that there is a process of deliberating, with a beginning in the 
question, a middle in the evaluation and a satisfying end in the 
judgment of value.
Questions for truth are 
followed by questions of 
value. 
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Underpinning the activities we can also perceive the 
cognitive, the affective and the volitional elements. Most obvious 
is the cognitive element. We ask questions, we seek information, 
we compare prices, we learn about apps and functions, we seek 
advice from others. But note also the affective element, the 
feelings that inform the process. We want, desire, wish for a 
new and better phone. We are perhaps envious of our friends, 
ashamed of our old-fashioned clunky machine; we are frustrated 
with the complications of functionality and price and variety 
available. Finally, we are happy with our choice, proud of our 
new acquisition, delighted to be in touch with our friends. There 
is also the volitional element, the deciding, which is operative 
from the beginning in our questioning, in each step forward that 
we make to the final decision of paying for the purchase. We can 
decide to stop, to reverse, to change direction at any stage of the 
process. 
Scale of Values
There are many different kinds of values. Above we considered 
an example of evaluating which is primarily economic. But the 
same process and the same components are involved in moral 
evaluations. Are all these values of equal worth? Or are values all 
the same? Or is there a chaos of values? One can slice values in 
various ways but the most fundamental is to follow the five levels 
of conscious activity constitutive of the human person. In that 
framework we can distinguish vital, social, cultural, moral and 
religious values in a hierarchical, structural scale of values.
Vital values are characteristic of the human person as living, 
as sensing, as embodied, as satisfying the needs of sensitive living. 
Health, vitality, energy, food, clothing, housing, propagation, 
growth, sleep, and the like are examples of vital values. Certain 
foods are good for you. Get a good night’s sleep. This will make 
you grow big and strong.  Vital values loosely correlate with the 
level of experiencing. You cannot pick up any magazine without 
being given free advice on what to eat, how to exercise, what is 
good for your health. We are all familiar with the adage, primum 
vivere, deinde philosophare, which might be translated, take care 
of vital values and then seek the higher. 
Social values are characteristic of the good order of a society. 
We are also social animals. There are various ways in which we 
structure social relations in a society of specialization of roles, 
cooperation, law and order, principles of equality, and the 
like. Efficiency, order, differentiation, regularity, cooperation, 
B r i a n  C r o n i n ,  C . S . S p .
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economic use of resources are examples of social values. They 
presuppose vital values but in principle are at a higher order as 
they loosely correlate with the level of understanding. We satisfy 
individual needs only in the context of a well-functioning polis 
or society.
Cultural values are the beliefs and values inherent in a way 
of life. These values are embodied in the constitution, inculcated 
in an educational system, they underpin the judicial system. We 
value truth, education, science, technology. We respect the values 
of tolerance and freedom and equality. The truth of our history 
is embodied in the myths, the institutions, traditions, stories, 
songs. Different cultures have various configurations or ways of 
expressing these cultural values. 
Moral values are the values implicit in our relations to 
one another as free and responsible human persons. Moral 
values correlate loosely with the level of deciding, valuing and 
implementing. This is the good of the individual as he realizes 
his freedom as a responsible person. Honesty, tolerance, justice, 
responsibility, freedom, equality, respect are examples of moral 
values.
Religious values trump all other values. To be fully human is 
to be more than human. And so homo religiosus (man a religious 
being) values holiness, unqualified love, worship, salvation, the 
gift of grace, prayer, and the like. The human person is by nature 
open to the divine and reaches fulfillment only in religious self-
transcendence.
The scale of values helps us to see that there are different 
levels of value, and that they are dependent on one another, 
the higher presupposing the lower and at the same time going 
beyond the lower and introducing something new and more 
valuable. Not all values are at the same level. Values are not all 
equal. The good is an analogous notion. The division into levels 
is not arbitrary but based on our complex nature as sensitive, 
intellectual, rational, moral and religious beings. 
It also reminds us that values are everywhere. They are 
embedded in every activity, every institution, every policy, in 
education, politics, laws, courts, governments, banks, hamburger 
joints, and the like. It is an illusion to say that anything is value-
free, usually a mask for a secular, relativist, politically correct 
agenda. I am claiming that we have the innate potential not only 
to know the truth but also to know the good, namely, value. 
To be fully human is to 
be more than human. 
The human person is by 
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Values are not arbitrary preferences as maintained by Emotivists 
but really give us objective knowledge of good and evil, value 
as true or false. That is not to say that we are always right, that 
we never make mistakes. But significantly we can recognize our 
mistakes, learn from them and avoid similar goofs in the future.
Intellectual Component 
Let us now attend to the process of evaluating and identify 
the role of intelligence and the role of feeling. This is the crucial 
issue between the emotivists and the rationalists. We take a 
middle course between these two extremes asserting the legitimate 
constitutive role of both intelligence and feeling. Let us first try 
to define the role of intelligence, reflection and deliberation, 
judgment, and later assess the role of feelings.
Emotivists in our popular culture assume the position that 
values are just expressions of arbitrary preferences guided by 
feelings mostly of self-interest. All we have to do to rebut this 
position is to attend to how in fact we ask questions about the 
worth of something, assemble  evidence and information relevant 
to seeking an answer, recognize the moment when the intellect 
seizes on the sufficiency of the evidence for a conclusion, and 
utters the judgment of value. We do not choose a mobile phone 
at random on feeling alone; we do not choose a career path on 
feeling alone; we do not choose a life partner in marriage on 
feeling alone; we do not choose to have or not to have an abortion 
on feeling alone. All sorts of relevant questions enter our mind, 
set us on a path of seeking relevant information, understanding 
and advice and move us towards a judgment. There is a crucial 
constitutive intellectual component in knowing the value of a 
course of action, a person, or the worth of something.
Once we start asking questions we are using our intelligence 
and seeking knowledge. As soon as we are asking questions about 
the worth of some thing or action or person we are seeking 
knowledge of values. In the moral sphere we ask questions about 
right and wrong, good and evil, right courses of actions and 
wrong courses of action. We ask about the moral fiber of our 
politicians, of our church leaders, of our bankers, of our media. 
Are they doing what they should be doing? Are they the kind 
of persons we would trust with our money or our children? Are 
they people of integrity, of honesty, of justice, of compassion, of 
duty? We are abundant in our judgments about people in the 
public eye. We seem to be able to reach conclusions about such 
people and judgments are the work of intelligence. For the most 
part we usually get it right but of course we can make mistakes. 
B r i a n  C r o n i n ,  C . S . S p .
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We can jump to conclusions, we can be biased, we can follow 
conventional wisdom, which may not always be right.
Lonergan recognized the question of value and the judgment 
of value but was not clear about what came in between.  In Insight 
he was very clear on the reflective insight which comes between 
the question of truth and the judgment of truth: it is the grasp of 
the sufficiency of the evidence and the link between the evidence 
and the conclusion. If there is sufficient relevant evidence for 
the conclusion, the judgment of truth follows.  It is not hard to 
notice that at the level of values a similar insight occurs, which 
we call the deliberative insight. It is an intellectual grasp of the 
sufficiency of the evidence for the value of something. We can 
know the value of something or some person. We can have a 
knowledge of good and evil. We can distinguish true and false 
values in general and in particular. We can judge the worth of 
something. Such judgments are not just true for me here and 
now and not true for you. They are objective in the sense that the 
conclusion rests on evidence that is relevant and sufficient: the 
conditions are fulfilled. The value judgment is the conclusion of 
an intellectual process of asking questions, assembling arguments 
and evidence, and finally coming to a conclusion. 
Affective Component
Does this mean that we have adopted a rationalist position? 
By no means. What then is the role of feelings in the process of 
evaluations, particularly moral judgments? Again we attend to 
questions of fact, to our own experience of moral evaluations. 
In a class here in Duquesne the students were able to name 
more than a hundred feelings within half an hour. Chief among 
them were desires, fears, love, hate, remorse, guilt, disgust, 
anger, responsibility, unease, tense, stressed, excited, perturbed, 
confused, hesitant, confident, and so on and so forth; the list 
is endless. Do these feelings enter into the process of moral 
deliberation? Of course they do. We are feeling animals. We are 
very articulate in naming and distinguishing various feelings. 
But how and where and to what extent do they enter into moral 
deliberation? 
We tend to think in terms of feelings that are good and 
feelings that are bad. Lonergan makes much of the distinction 
between intentional and non-intentional feelings.3 I do not think 
that these are the relevant distinctions we need here. The key 
distinction seems to be between (1) feelings which normally 
result in self-transcendence and (2) feelings which are morally 
ambiguous. This is a distinction Lonergan does make a few 
sentences later.4
We can distinguish true 
and false values...
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(1) What are these feelings which normally tend to 
development, to conversion, to knowing and choosing the true 
and the good? In Insight Lonergan constantly talks about the 
importance of the pure detached unrestricted desire to know. His 
whole position on human knowing, the dynamic of the activities, 
the intentionality implicit in the activities, rests on the desire to 
know. We feel it in our curiosity, our wonder, our questioning, 
our searching, our joy in success and our frustration at failure. 
Lonergan never explicitly names the desire to know as a feeling. 
But if a desire to know is not a feeling what is it? Are not desires 
feelings? We feel them, they move us in a certain direction, they 
are the mass momentum drive of human living. The desire to 
know is one way of identifying the feelings that normally lead 
us in the direction of self-transcendence. It is deep, long lasting, 
gives direction to our search, leads us to inquire relentlessly for 
truth and value. It is what distinguishes us from brute animals. 
 
What is the role of this desire? Is it extrinsic to the process of 
knowing or is it constitutive of the process? I would answer in this 
way. Can you imagine a knowing that does not start in a desire 
to know expressed in questioning, driving you forward through 
research and deliberating, forcing you to make a judgment when 
sufficient evidence is grasped, and is content that truth has been 
attained.  Without the desire to know we do not ask questions 
and so do not understand anything. Understanding is a dynamic 
activity and the dynamic is provided by the desire to know. Even 
Aristotle recognized the active role of intellect in questioning and 
its passive role of receiving insights. Aristotle’s active intellect 
throws light on images so that we may understand; it initiates 
the process of knowing; it is in act rather than in potency. The 
active intellect is the pure question. The passive intellect receives, 
it is somehow passive. Insight comes suddenly and unexpectedly 
as a release of the tension of inquiry; it passes into the habitual 
texture of the mind. But the intellect, Aquinas will insist, is 
one personal intellect. So we can assert that the desire to know 
simply as a feeling is a constitutive element of human knowing 
of truth and value. In his later writings, Lonergan shifted to the 
terminology of the transcendental precepts to identify more 
clearly the feelings that lead to self-transcendence, namely, be 
attentive, be intelligent, be reasonably, be responsible, be in love. 
 
(2)  Besides those feelings aiming at self-transcendence, there 
is a class of feelings which are morally ambiguous; they can lead 
in the right direction or not. These are sensitive feelings, feelings 
that are biological and involve sensitive, chemical or biological 
changes; they are bodily based. They are morally ambiguous in 
B r i a n  C r o n i n ,  C . S . S p .
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the sense that in themselves they are neither good nor bad: it is 
only in the context of a free developing moral person knowing, 
deciding and acting that such feelings enter into the moral 
domain. Anger is an example of such a feeling. One can be filled 
with righteous anger over injustice, corruption, discrimination, 
child abuse and the like. One should feel angry at such evils. On 
the other hand, you have the more selfish anger of road rage, 
anger at a crying baby on a plane, anger at what is perceived as 
personal slights.
 
A counselor might ask, how do you feel about that? Are you 
comfortable with that? It is a legitimate question. In discerning 
our feeling orientation we should be able to distinguish the deep 
rooted sense of obligation to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable 
and responsible, from the more superficial, sensitive, transient, 
ambiguous feelings of desire, attraction, or satisfaction. 
Volitional Element
There is yet another central element to be taken into account 
when we are judging the value of a course of action and that is 
our effective freedom. We are capable of knowing what is right 
and good but not actually deciding in line with that judgment. 
This is supremely irrational but that is the point where we are not 
necessitated to follow our intellect but can choose to turn from 
good and do evil. Sin is supremely irrational but it happens all 
the time. So we acknowledge the possibility that our judgments 
of value are influenced by (1) rationalization when we adjust 
our knowledge to suit our actions, by (2) moral renunciation, 
when we renounce our ability to do good,  and by (3) the flight 
from reflection into blind, thoughtless, activism. The notion 
of freedom would require a few volumes to explore adequately 
but in current culture it is mostly misunderstood as freedom of 
choice, freedom to do as you please, lack of constraints, freedom 
to follow your bliss, whatever that might be. We need to retrieve 
a notion of freedom as self-determination, as responsible, as a 
positive dynamic, as deciding for good as opposed to evil. 
Conscience
Conscience is a key notion in any contemporary moral 
philosophy. Our account of the activities of questioning, 
deliberating, judging, deciding and implementing the judgment 
as well as the three components of cognitive, affective and 
volitional, all unite and help us to understand  the notion of 
conscience. Conscience is not just a little voice or a feeling of 
guilt. It is an awareness of the feeling of moral obligation and 
our fidelity or infidelity to that imperative in our deliberation, 
We are capable of 
knowing what is right 
and good but not actually 
deciding in line with that 
judgment. 
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decision and action. Our analysis of knowledge of value has 
included an intellectual element, an affective element, and an 
element of freedom. Conscience encompasses the whole process 
from beginning to end. It is both a feeling and an intellectual 
process, unfolding in responsible freedom. To be human is to be 
moral. We are aware of our good deeds as well as of our twists 
and turns away from the good. Conscience is supreme in the 
sense that in the end we are responsible for what we value and 
make of ourselves.  We decide for ourselves what we are to make 
of ourselves.   
Conclusion
We used to teach moral philosophy/theology in terms 
of giving clear yes or no answers to every imaginable case of 
conscience. In the end it is impossible to cover all imaginable 
cases. Perhaps it would be better to empower people to make 
moral judgments of value for themselves. Talk of values is 
legitimate and helpful in today’s moral climate. People are going 
to follow what they personally value, sometimes irrespective of 
authority or church or culture. Unfortunately, values are often 
regarded as passing feelings or as arbitrary choices. However, 
there is a sound philosophical underpinning to doing ethics 
from the point of view of values. This is foundational in the 
sense that we can recognize the activities and the components 
involved in good valuing. These capabilities are inherent in every 
human person. This approach focusses on the good person as 
the standard and criterion of goodness following the lead of 
Aristotle5. Good value judgments are the a priori conditions for 
the possibility of becoming a good person. A value framework 
provides a grid or background from which more proximate or 
specific methods of discerning the good either by principles of 
natural law or by virtue ethics can be applied. Such an ethic is 
appropriate to an age of interiority where we take possession of 
our own intellectual, affective and volitional dimensions. Our 
attempting to express our values in mission and vision statements 
is soundly based both philosophically and theologically.
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